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Communication:

To the Editor of the NEW ENGLAND SOCIAL STUDIES BULLETIN:

In your March, 1951, issue appeared an article by Arthur B. Darling of Phillips Academy, Andover, entitled *School and College and The Social Studies.* The author made these contentions: 1) That instead of deprecating advanced study of the social studies at the secondary school level the colleges should welcome it, and that they should give well-trained students advanced standing; 2) that the former essay-type, substantive tests of the College Entrance Examination Board were abandoned for no good reason save that of economy, and that their disappearance has resulted in "distinct losses" for both schools and colleges; and 3) that the present Social Studies Test of the College Entrance Examination Board offers little evidence of achievement and strengthens no ties between school and college social studies departments.

Mr. Darling expressed the hope that his article would "stir discussion in the pages of this journal among the school and college teachers who are interested." I suppose I am a logical person to take up this challenge because at the time the subject examinations were abandoned I was one of the Examiners in American History and am now the principal perpetrator of the Social Studies Test.

Unfortunately for those who may hope for a battle royal I find myself as much disposed to agree with Mr. Darling as to attack him. My position somehow reminds me of that of A. E. Housman, speaking at a dinner of Oxford men at Cambridge. "Cambridge," said Housman, "has seen strange sights. It has seen Wordsworth drunk and Porson sober. And here am I—a better scholar than Wordsworth, a better poet than Porson —betwixt and between."

Should colleges give credit for advanced work in school?

In the first place, I heartily endorse all Mr. Darling has to say in urging that the colleges welcome instead of discourage serious study of the social studies in school and that they give advanced standing to superior students. If the proper study of mankind is man, there is little reason to hold off until college. Instead, there is abundant evidence that by the 11th and 12th grades many intelligent students are fully prepared to do work equivalent in difficulty to introductory college courses. To deny them the opportunity to do such work is to waste their time

and talents. For the colleges to force such students to go over ground already covered is to doom them, as Mr. Darling says, to boredom.

The situation is, however, improving in this regard. For some years now personal letters and inter-departmental treaties have made it possible for better students to anticipate introductory courses and go on to advanced work. Further, many of the new introductory courses, such as the "General Education" courses at Harvard or the American Studies course at Amherst, have an approach so different from that of school courses that students do not find them repetitive. Where, however, a good student is faced with the requirement of repeating, say, a chronological survey course in American History, his college would be wise not merely to allow, but to require him to move ahead. While it may appear that going over the same ground with different readings and different instructions would give him a more solid foundation, too often the sense of repetitiveness induces the student to loaf and to get by on his previous knowledge. Better to challenge him by pushing him into unfamiliar territory.

Why were the essay-type subject tests abandoned, and what have been the effects?

Mr. Darling maintains that there was "no good reason, save that of economy perhaps, for abandoning the substantive examinations." Economy was surely a major reason, and in its own right a compelling one. The substantive examinations were expensive. In 1940, for instance, the cost of reading a single blue-book in American History was $1.18. The examination fee was $10.00. This occasioned no difficulty for a private school student who could easily afford the money and who was taking the test at his own school. But the arrangement was unfair to students from small towns, especially west of the Appalachians, where there was no examination center. They had not only to pay the fee but to bear the expense of travel to the nearest center and of living expenses during a testing period averaging four or five days.

Economy was by no means the only reason for abandoning the former substantive tests. These tests took so long to administer and required so much manpower to correct that they were given in June after most schools had closed for the summer. The results were not in the hands of the colleges until July, and applicants often did not learn their fate until August. This delay often worked real hardship. The present tests, given four

times a year, allow the colleges to process applicants far more quickly.

The most compelling reason, to my mind, for the abandonment of the substantive examinations was that they were not particularly successful predictors of success in college. They favored too much the private schools and those eastern high schools which prepared specifically for the examination. Such experiences as the following made college admissions officers suspect that the substantive examinations were something less than infallible. A student from a Milwaukee high school with a fine scholastic record, a high IQ, and good scores on the objective-type subject tests, was granted a scholarship to Harvard on condition that he simply pass the subject examinations. Yet when he took them, he failed every one. Harvard decided to admit him anyway, as a test case. By the end of his freshman year he was on the Dean's List. Another high school student who was the very last member of the freshman class to be admitted, when the admissions committee were scraping the bottom of the barrel, graduated *summa cum laude*. Colleges such as Harvard were anxious to broaden their base and to draw their student body from a wider area. To do this they had to ignore or abandon the old College Entrance Examination Board tests.

Of course, it had also been discovered that tests alone—*any* tests—are not a sufficient guide for admission. The "PRL" (Predicted Rank List) at Harvard, for instance, which has proved remarkably accurate, combines not merely test results, but school grades and even subjective impressions of the student from teachers and friends. In order to assess school grades the colleges have kept track of what they mean in different institutions. Even without substantive tests the eastern colleges, which alone used the former substantive examinations, know, for instance, that a C- in American History at Andover means a considerable achievement.

The precipitating cause for the abandonment of the former tests was American entrance into World War II. With students leaving school and entering college at odd times, it was no longer possible to retain the June examinations. Why, however, were they not revived after the war? One reason, in addition to those already mentioned, was that Pearl Harbor had simply delivered the *coup de grace* to what was already a dying institution. For more than a decade the number of students taking the College Entrance Examination Board subject tests had steadily dwindled. From 1932 until 1941 the total number

of examinations read dropped from 62,075 to 35,920. In history the drop was from 6,788 to 3,600.

One may admit the practical reasons for abandoning the essay-type tests and yet deplore their demise. The Dean of one women's college declared in 1942 that the abandonment of the written tests might prove as great a blow to western culture as the fall of France! For my own part I look back on preparing for the tests with a good deal of nostalgia. I am not sure that at any time since their disappearance have I got so much solid, systematic work out of boys. I am sure that I have never reviewed the year's work so thoroughly. I miss being in the happy position of being *in league with my students* to help them get through the examinations with a high grade. The reading period in New York provided a wonderful chance for men and women from colleges, high schools, and private schools to get together. Even now, ten years after the last reading period, I keep up friendships and professional contacts made during the five or six years I read American History papers. The position of reader was rotated so that hundreds of teachers had the opportunity for these most stimulating pedagogical gatherings.

There is no question but that the former tests induced thorough teaching. Perhaps the best thing about them was that they required training in writing—an art which, if present educational trends continue, may become as obsolete as the use of a broad-axe.

Yet if the written substantive tests had great value, they were not without serious ill effects. About 1945 a pamphlet by college and school men on the teaching of English in secondary schools concluded that, "The definite entrance requirements of the colleges and the examinations based upon them . . . (tended) to highly formal and profitless methods of instruction." The same could be said of history. It was Standard Operating Procedure, even for some schools which claimed to "take the examinations in their stride," to push along rapidly in order to finish covering new ground by May 1. Then began what was often a deadly-dull and stultifying business of learning "canned biographies," outline books, and lists of dates, then regurgitating the material by writing dozens of questions from former examinations. One school devised a method equally fitted to get all students through the examinations and to make sure that few, if any, would attempt history again. This was to go through a text ten pages at a time and to spend class time writing former college board questions at the blackboard. There were all sorts of trick ways of falsifying the record and many teachers had their carefully-guarded trade

secrets. I can now safely reveal one of mine, used in preparing students in European History. I had all the map work for the year done on the same outline maps as were used in the College Entrance Examination itself. From study of the previous examinations for twenty years I had worked out a frequency table of "locatable" areas, boundaries, and places. (Alsace, for instance, is locatable; Brandenburg is not.) The last few hours before the test students located all of the places likely to appear on the map question. The chances were almost even that a student of mine would get a perfect score on the map question; he would certainly get a high score. For the poor student this was a practically ironclad insurance against failure. For the good student it was a bonus which almost guaranteed an honor. But it had very little to do with knowledge of history and nothing whatever to do with the chances of later success in college.

Concentration on the examination not only encouraged much bad teaching. It also inhibited teachers from putting into practice techniques in which they believed or from covering areas of social studies not covered in the College Board "Definition of Requirements." As Frank H. Bowles, Director of the College Entrance Examination Board, wrote in 1948: "Many secondary school officials felt that the removal of the Definition of Requirements was a figurative breaking of shackles to free secondary school teachers from hampering restrictions."

It is my considered opinion that as a result of this "breaking of the shackles" the teaching of history in the private schools, which formerly prepared practically all their students for the substantive tests, is now on a generally more mature plane than it was ten years ago. There is more emphasis on preparing students for the type of work they will meet after they get in college, less on merely preparing for the examinations that will get them in.

Does the present Social Studies Test have any value in predicting success in college and does it inhibit school-college relations?

Mr. Darling expressed several common criticisms of the Social Studies Test when he wrote:

> "It has been asserted . . . with some observation to support the statement, that to-day all a student needs in a social-studies examination of the College Board is a pencil, eraser, and a coin; the machine will do the rest. Offered a choice among four or five propositions that are correct, nearly correct, possibly wrong, or frankly absurd, the student may not have to resort to the coin. Nor is he obliged to do much

else. His neuro-muscular response hardly rises above a spinal ganglion. Should he venture to use the higher centers, search the material, winnow conflicting evidence, find the determinant among several variable factors, and reach a judgment, he may prove wiser than the machine. But he will be wrong to the statisticians of the Board, and therefore to the authorities of the college of his choice."

Obviously this is not to be taken too seriously, but it may interest readers to know the specific measures taken 1) to avoid "frankly absurd" answers, 2) to raise the "neuro-muscular response . . . above a spinal ganglion," and 3) to try to prevent a student from being "wiser than the machine."

All questions used in the Social Studies Test are pre-tested on a large and representative group of students, and the results are subject to careful analysis. One element in the analysis is to find whether the "distractors" (wrong answers) really distract. A distractor so patently absurd that it is selected by few or no students is eliminated and a more plausible one invented. As regards raising the neuro-muscular response to the higher centers, those who make up the test have constantly been aware of two common weaknesses of objective-type tests: they often test only canned knowledge, and they tend to favor the facile guesser. Therefore, not more than one-quarter of the test is the usual one-out-of-five multiple choice. Throughout the test is an attempt to make success depend on understanding rather than on mere rote-knowledge, and an attempt to devise some questions requiring a fairly high level of grasp of ideas and relationships, as well as an ability to *stay with* the question until the student sees light. In fact, although I prefer the essay-type examination and seldom use anything else in teaching, I think that a high grade in the present Social Studies Test requires a higher level of ability than in the former essay-type examinations.

As regards its basic purpose—predicting success in college—the Social Studies Test seems fairly successful. A very early form of the test, which takes one hour, was slightly better than the three-hour test in American History in predicting success in three introductory social studies courses at Harvard. Results at other colleges have corroborated those at Harvard. The examination tries, as has been often said, to provide a "snapshot" rather than a "posed portrait." Based for the most part on knowledge students acquire in standard courses, it nevertheless puts the material in new juxtaposition to see whether a student has really grasped the knowledge to which he has been exposed. The private schools have therefore been deprived of much of the

advantage they used to enjoy through more intensive training along clearly defined paths. For some years the average score of public and private school students has been almost exactly the same.

As regards predictability even within the private schools themselves it is doubtful whether the former examinations predicted much better than the present test. I base this statement on study of the school records and test results of some hundreds of students in several different schools. The former test relatively favored the hard-working, not-too-bright "late-blooming serious." The results were often thrown out of whack because in an essay-type test there must of necessity be relatively few questions. A single question for which a student was either very well or very ill prepared threw out the result. Furthermore, no matter how skilled the reading, there were always serious deviations in reading standards. In the new test the great number of items—from 120 to 150—prevents over-emphasis of a particular topic. The really exhaustive analysis each question receives means a high proportion of really effective questions. The new test seems to favor students who combine high verbal aptitude with an active interest in the problems of society—debaters, Student Federalists, editors of school papers.

I must finally agree with Mr. Darling's contention that under the old dispensation there was a closer tie between schools and colleges. The schools knew what was expected of them; the colleges knew what to expect. As has already been mentioned, the reading period brought several hundred school and college teachers together every year. There has been a further loosening of the ties because the colleges are drawing students from wider areas. In 1925 Harvard drew on 250 schools; now it draws on 450. In addition, released of an external check, schools are following their own lines. In general, the private schools seem to concentrate on history and often lead their best students into realms which used to be the province of the colleges. The high schools tend to de-emphasize history other than American (save for a 10th grade scamper through the centuries, quaintly called "world history") and put greater stress on community and contemporary problems. Whether these deviations from a norm are good or bad I do not know. I do, however, strongly agree with Mr. Darling that the business of creating better understanding and a closer communication between school and college is a major problem of social studies teaching.

HENRY W. BRAGDON
Phillips Exeter Academy

The Historiography Of The Laird Rams

The recent publication of the *Journal of Benjamin Moran*[1] for the Civil War years gives an occasion to examine once again the much discussed but never wholly clarified incident of the Laird Rams. These iron-clads, built by Lairds at Birkenhead as part of Captain Bullock's schemes for providing a Confederate navy, were the cause of a severe crisis in Anglo-American Civil War diplomacy. The incident is well known as forming part of the complex question of neutral obligations; but, without touching upon the legal aspect, there yet remains considerable disagreement upon the manner in which the ships were actually detained.

"*El Mounassir*" and "*El Tousson*," as the iron-clads were known, far superior to anything the Union could have offered in opposition,[2] were designed to perform a more valuable service to the Confederacy than commerce raiders of the *Alabama* type: they were to raise the blockade. Still greater hopes were pinned upon them by the many who believed the issue of the rams would drive the North to war with England. Then the South would gain its long-sought diplomatic recognition, as well as a formidable ally. The Union revealed its respect for the rams by sending a secret mission to try to outbid the Confederacy for their purchase—an act which would have been exactly the same breach of the British Foreign Enlistment Acts as that of which the Confederacy was accused.

Charles Francis Adams, the American Minister in London, worked unceasingly to prevent the departure of the ships, and kept Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, under a bombardment of protest notes and evidence of Confederate ownership.[3] On 1 September, 1863, Russell, who was in Scotland throughout these events, had written Adams: "Her Majesty's Government are advised that they cannot interfere in anyway with these vessels. A Court of Justice would never condemn in the absence of evidence, and the Government would be justly blamed for acting in defiance of the principles of law and justice." Adams did not receive this letter until the 4th, when Russell wrote again: "I have to inform you that the matter is under the seri-

[1] University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949. ed. Wallace and Gillespie.

[2] 224.5 feet overall, 2750 tons displacement. Armour 4.5 ins. They carried four 12 ton rifled guns mounted in turrets.

[3] The case differed from that of the *Alabama*, avowedly a Confederate ship, but unarmed. The ironclads had rams and were *ipso facto* armed. Confederate ownership was therefore disguised. The most persistent defence was that the vessels were for the Pasha of Egypt—hence their names.

ous and anxious consideration of Her Majesty's Government." On the 5th, the Foreign Office received Adams' famous note of that date in which the Minister had thought it "superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war. In my belief it is impossible that any nation, retaining a proper degree of self-respect, could tamely submit to a continuation of relations so utterly deficient in reciprocity." On the same afternoon the Foreign Office wrote to tell Seward that steps had been taken to detain the rams. Adams did not hear of this until the 8th. When the correspondence became public after the rams had been detained, the Opposition accused the British Ministry of having made an illegal seizure under threats from the American Minister, particularly his note of the 5th. Government, however, maintained it had acted on evidence, independently of the American notes.

In his detailed and gossipy *Journal*, Benjamin Moran, second Secretary of Legation, argues that the accusations of intimidation were well-founded and that it was in fact the note of September 5th which spurred the Foreign Office to action.

> "Monday 5 Oct. 1863. George Harrington, the Assistant Secretary of the U. S. Treasury, has arrived in London with several important Despatches. He has been at the Legation but I have not seen him yet. One of the notes he brought is marked Confidential, is dated the 19th of September, & contains the following curious history. It states that Mr. Stuart, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Washington had called on Mr. Seward, under instructions from London, and informed him he was directed to say that orders had been given on the 5th September, before the reception of Mr. Adams' note of that date, to stop the Iron-clad rams at Lairds' ship yard in Liverpool, and that they had accordingly been stopped before the note was delivered at the Foreign Office. This statement was made by Mr. Stuart 'to counteract the effect of news to the contrary, which might reach Washington from other quarters'—the other quarters being of course Mr. Adams. There is no doubt that this was authorized by Lord Palmerston, for Ld. Russell was not then in town. On its face it looks very well; but it is not true. On that very 5th Sept., *at 3 o'clock in the afternoon*, Mr. Adams received a note from Lord Russell dated on the 4th, in which he says the matter of stopping the rams 'is under the serious and anxious consideration of H. M.'s Government.' That note must have left the Foreign Office at about half past two, for Mr. Adams' note left the Legation at that hour & arrived at the F.O. at 3, precisely the same hour at which Lord Russell's note reached

us. Up to that time it is quite clear the 'matter was (still) under the serious and anxious consideration of H.M.'s Gov't'—but consideration at once took the form of action on the reception of Mr. Adams' note; and then to make it appear that that action was in no way prompted by Mr. Adams this story was hastily concocted by Lord Palmerston and sent to Mr. Stuart to be communicated to our Government. The object was twofold: 1st to appear to Mr. Lincoln as having acted spontaneously in the business from a sense of justice; and 2ndly to be able to say to Parliament when questioned that H.M.'s Gov't. had not been bullied into stopping the rams by Mr. Adams, but had acted in the premises from its own convictions, regardless of outside pressure. But if this is really so, why did they not send these facts to Mr. Adams instead of to Washington? And then, does not the assertion that Mr. Stuart's statement was made 'to counteract news to the contrary which might reach Washington from other quarters' show that the stopping really was prompted by Mr. Adams note? That announcement was not made to Mr. Adams until Tuesday, the 8th Sept."

Was Moran's interpretation or that of the British Government correct?

One of the earliest historians of these incidents, Montague Bernard,[4] contented himself with presenting a full catalogue of Confederate shipbuilding but passed lightly over the rams as of little importance, on the apparent assumption that the entire issue had been settled by the arrest of the cruiser *Alexandra* in the Spring of 1863. Bernard, writing before the arbitration of Geneva, chiefly sought to defend the prospective legal case of the United Kingdom. Spencer Perceval's *Lord John Russell* takes a similar casual view of the incident.

The first established account of the affair which carefully discussed chronology was J. F. Rhodes' *History of the United States*.[5] Rhodes remarked that on 3 September Russell had written Palmerston that

> "The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the two iron-clads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained. The Solicitor-General has been consulted, and concurs in the measure as one of policy though not of strict law.
>
> We shall thus test the law, and if we have to pay damages, we have satisfied that opinion which prevails here as

[4] *The Neutrality of Gt. Britain during the American Civil War*, London 1870.
[5] Vol. IV, Ch. 22, 377 ff.

well as in America, that that kind of neutral hostility should not be allowed to go on without some attempt to stop it.

If you do not approve, please appoint a Cabinet for Tuesday or Wednesday next."

On the same day a telegram from Russell to Layard, the Under Secretary of State, produced instructions to the Treasury to detain the rams should they attempt to leave port.

Russell laboured under a very real legal difficulty in obtaining convictions, a difficulty which had lost him the *Alexandra* case and which would force the preemption of the rams. Rhodes believed Russell had reached his decision by the course of his own reflections both upon the *Alabama* deception and upon the possibility of war. Rhodes also recalled that news of Northern victories was arriving (that of Gettysburg came on August 16th) and that the British were conscious of the importance of precedent in case of future wars of their own. Further, the large British merchant fleet would be highly exposed to commerce raiders armed in neutral ports, a point the *Times* stressed in its issue of September 3rd.

Rhodes thus rejected the charge that Russell was forced into the detention by Adams' note of the 5th. Russell had reached his decision independently of the notes of early September. Charles Francis Adams Jr., who was in close correspondence with Rhodes on this subject, accepts the latter's version.[6] In 1927 Channing[7] added his subscription to the Rhodes interpretation, and in his otherwise unconventional *King Cotton Diplomacy* F. L. Owsley did the same.

It was E. D. Adams who denied most emphatically that the note of the 5th was decisive.[8] He agrees with Rhodes in presenting Russell as fair and anxious to prevent injury to the United States. While the rams did not present a serious crisis, English policy having already been set when the *Alexandra* was arrested in April. E. D. Adams thus returned to the thesis of Montague Bernard. Russell's motive seems to have been his fear of an American use of privateers to interfere with British commerce and perhaps provoke war. The Minister's delays were

[6] *Life of Charles Francis Adams*, Boston and New York, 1900. In his brief memoir of his father given to the Massachusetts Historical Society in October, 1899, C. F. Adams Jr. implies that the note of the 5th was decisive. But the study is brief and the reference casual.

[7] *History of the U. S.*, New York, Vol. VI. Channing alone of these authors used the Moran Journal, although not in connection with the rams. The relevant portions of the Journal were printed in the Mass. Hist. Soc. *Proceedings*, May, 1915, but no comment was made upon the portions significant here.

[8] *Gt. Britain & the American Civil War*, London, 1925. Vol. II, Ch. 13.

merely the result of his search for evidence, and he would have acted without evidence had it been necessary.

Here Adams' argument is perhaps weakest. When Russell acted on the *Alexandra* he acted with faith in the law and was defeated. There is no surety that he had determined to ignore the law if required to in the future. Certainly he waited till the last moment to act if his mind had been made up all the time—he ran a grave risk of another *Alabama* escape. A great deal of Adams' argument, moreover, rests upon a curious mistake. As evidence of Russell's having made up his mind in the Spring Adams uses the Minister's letter of 3 September, quoted above, under the date of 3 April, notwithstanding the fact that he refers to the letter again—without quotation—under its correct date.

Even if E. D. Adams' estimate of the importance of the rams incident in its wider aspect is at least questionable, he agrees with the Rhodes' interpretation of the exchange of notes, adding an explanation of the delay until the 8th in informing C. F. Adams of the detention orders. Russell was negotiating with Lairds for evidence of Confederate ownership on the understanding that the Government was still undecided. Not until the 8th did Lairds finally refuse to give information.

Moran's arguments clearly cannot be accepted. Adams' note of the 5th could hardly have produced Russell's action on the 3rd. Moreover, Moran's discussion of times ignores the possibility or, to judge from instances given in other parts of the *Journal* itself, the probability of delays in transmission through the lower levels of the Foreign Office. The most that we can credit to the note of the 5th is that it may have hastened the note to Seward and thus in part have committed the British to an action already taken but not previously revealed to an American.[9]

Before we dismiss Adams' anxious note-writing in these early September days as merely an uneventful continuation of an almost habitual pressure, another possibility must be considered. In 1911 Mr. Brookes Adams, another son of the American Minister, presented a fresh interpretation to the Massachusetts Historical Society.[10] Hostile to Great Britain, in this long study he sought to refute the picture of British procrastination, legalistic but well-intentioned, previously drawn by Rhodes and C. F. Adams. The British are depicted by Brookes Adams as being driven to reluctant concession. Gladstone is "notoriously shifty," Palmerston "very often acted by instinct like an animal";

[9] The version that the note of the 5th was vital continues to appear in the more general treatments of the period. cf. Callahan, *American Policy in Canadian Relations*, New York 1937, p. 275.

[10] *Proceedings*, Dec. 1911. p. 243 ff.

both represented "an insolent, contemptuous, unscrupulous and vindictive aristocracy." Whatever our own opinion of these men, clearly Mr. Brookes Adams was eager to seize any interpretation unfavourable to the British. He admitted that Russell's note of the 3rd did in fact prove that Adams' note two days later on the 5th was ineffective. But Mr. Brookes Adams now advanced the new theory that it was his father's note of the 3rd which had been decisive.

> "Strangely enough, this diplomatic gem [note of the 5th] was not needed. For once Mr. Adams' instinct had failed him. He, possibly through anxiety, credited Lord Russell with more tenacity than he had. Mr. Adams already had prevailed. England had surrendered to the note of the third."[11]

The note of the 3rd had accompanied some new evidence on Confederate ownership. It was in strong terms, and referred to the "grave nature of the situation in which both countries must be placed in the event of an act of aggression committed against the Government and people of the U. S. by either of these formidable vessels." If Russell was influenced by Adams' communication of the 3rd, it was by the political note and not by the legal evidence attached. This becomes apparent on several counts. If the note reached Russell in Scotland in time to affect his judgment on the 3rd it must have been sent by telegraph.[12] But it is unlikely that documentary evidence could have been satisfactorily telegraphed, although its content might have been. Yet Adams himself admitted the evidence was "of no great additional weight." Moreover, when in the Commons debate of February, 1864, Government defended its actions by claiming that Russell wrote his note of the 4th and detained the rams because of new and adequate evidence, the Opposition were able to point out that the Government's excuse for delaying prosecution was a lack of sufficient evidence. In fact, on February 8th, 1864, Lairds were informed that it would be necessary to send a mission abroad to collect evidence. Thus if it was in response to Adams' communications of that day that Russell took his measures of the 3rd, it was the threat, not the evidence, which prevailed.

Whether Adams' note did reach Russell in time to govern his actions has yet to be proved. Even a search of the documents for endorsements of receipt could only give an answer if the hours as well as the days of receipt were recorded. But the only

[11] Ibid, p. 297.

[12] This is possible, although the Foreign Office did not endorse a time of receipt.

rival explanation is Rhodes' theory of a gradual autonomous change in Russell's mind and this theory is, by its nature, pure hypothesis. With the evidence at present available the student can only form his own judgment by deciding whether the events suggest an abrupt or progressive change in British policy. It does not seem possible to dismiss Mr. Brookes Adams' interpretation as completely as most modern historians appear to have done.

At the very least it must be admitted that although Russell acted on the 3rd he did not tell Adams until he received the latter's note of the same day, for when he wrote on the 4th he did so specifically in reply to that note. Thus the note had the effect of producing the first intimation to an American that the British were still considering intervention. Perhaps we may discover whether it had the greater effect of prompting Russell's action when Professor Alan Nevins treats the episode in his *Seward*.

The Exchequer paid £220,000 for the rams when they were pre-empted to avoid possible defeat in the Courts. The historical accounts give the impression that the money was a sacrifice to the cause of peace. This is far from the truth. The Admiralty got full value for its money for, as H.M.S. *Scorpion* and H.M.S. *Wivern*, these ships were in commission as "coastal service, turret" vessels until 1900 and 1901 respectively. We may think what we like of Lairds' politics but, despite the unusual circumstances, they built their ships to last.

LAURENCE W. MARTIN
Christ's College, Cambridge

United States Troops Killed American Citizens At Brownsville

Possibly no more unusual event in American history has ever taken place than the shooting of American citizens at Brownsville, Texas, by United States troops, all members of the 25th Infantry, on August 13, 1906. In response to a Senate resolution addressed to President Theodore Roosevelt, a thorough investigation was made of the entire affair. The President then made a report in two special messages to the Senate, December 19th, 1906, and January 14th, 1907. As a result of the Presidential investigation, nearly all of the members of B, C, and D Companies were ordered discharged, by name, from the Army.

According to the report, there was some eveidence that considerable bad feeling had developed between the the colored troops stationed at Fort Brown and the people of Brownsville, which finally rose to the point where the soldiers attacked the town's citizens. The attack was made suddenly and near midnight. President Roosevelt, in his message of December 19, reported that "from nine to fifteen or twenty of the colored soldiers took part in the attack. They leaped over the walls from the barracks and hurried through the town. They shot at whomever they saw moving, and they shot into houses where they saw lights. In some of these houses were women and children, as the would-be murderers must have known. In one house in which there were two women and five children some ten shots went through at a height of about four and one half feet above the floor, one putting out the light upon the table. The lieutenant of police of the town heard the firing and rode toward it. He met the raiders, who, as he stated were about fifteen colored soldiers. They instantly started firing upon him. He turned and rode off, and they continued firing upon him until they had killed his horse. They shot him in the right arm; it was afterward amputated above the elbow. A number of shots were also fired at two other policemen. The raiders fired several times into a hotel, some of the shots being aimed at a guest sitting by the window. They shot into a saloon, killing the bartender and wounding another man. At the same time other raiders fired into another house in which women and children were sleeping, two of the shots going through the mosquito bar over the bed in which the mistress of the house and her two children were lying. Several other houses were struck by bullets. It was at night

and the streets of the town are poorly lighted, so that none of the individual raiders was recognized, but the evidence of many witnesses of all classes was conclusive to the effect that the raiders were negro soldiers. The shattered bullets, shells, and clips of the government rifles, which were found on the ground, are merely corroborative. So are the bullet holes in the houses; some of which it appears must, from the direction, have been fired from the fort just at the moment when the soldiers left it. Not a bullet hole appears in any of the structures of the fort."[1]

No one, according to this message, had anticipated the attack. It was entirely unprovoked and the soldiers took complete initiative in the matter. They met with no resistance whatsoever, and apparently were bent on causing as much destruction as possible. The white officers of the Company had been taken completely by surprise. In fact it was two or three in the morning before any of them knew the truth about the incident.

After further careful investigation, however, several important developments were found to have had a bearing on the attack. President Roosevelt carefully summarized these in a second special message to the Senate on January 14, 1907. "It appears from the testimony that on the night of the 13th. of August, 1906, several crimes were committed by some person or persons in the city of Brownsville. Among these were the following:

a. The murder of Frank Natus.
b. The assault with intent to kill the lieutenant of police, Dominguez, whose horse was killed under him and whose arm was shot so severely that it had to be amputated.
c. The assault with intent to kill Mr. and Mrs. Hale Odin, and their little boy, who were in the window of the Miller Hotel.
d. The shooting into several private residences in the city of Brownsville three of them containing women and children.
e. The shooting at and slightly wounding of Palermo Preciado."[2]

In another section of the report the President stated that the Troops shot at least eight bullets into the Cowen house, putting out a lighted lamp on the dining room table. Mrs. Cowen and her five children were in the house and threw them-

[1] Richardson, *"Select Messages of the Presidents,"* p. 7711 (Bureau of National Literature, 1912).
[2] Ibid, p. 7718.

selves prone on the floor and were not hit. Soldiers also fired into the Starck house, the bullets going through the mosquito bar from eighteen to twenty inches above a bed where little children were sleeping. There was a light in the children's room.

The seriousness of these facts could not be overlooked, and they played a substantial part in President Roosevelt's later disciplinary action. Some citizens were inclined to believe that the President's strict measures against the members of the 25th Infantry were dictated, in part at least, by the fact that all the men involved were colored. This, of course, was clearly not the case, and no one who had any acquaintance with Roosevelt's racial philosophy could have accused him of such a policy. The disciplinary action was a necessary outcome of the case. Only a lucky circumstance had prevented the murder of many small children. The President stressed the fact that General Nettleton, in a special report, had said that in a cottage near his headquarters in Brownsville a children's party had just broken up before the house was riddled with bullets, fired by United States troops, from United States Springfield rifles, at close range, with the purpose of killing or maiming the children and their parents.

Taken together these facts pointed to the extreme seriousness of the situation. Typically, the President hit hard at the lack of discipline among men wearing the uniform of the Army, who would perpetrate such a crime. He considered "the act was one of horrible atrocity, and so far as he was aware, unparalleled for infamy in the annals of the army." He further remarked that "a blacker crime never stained the annals of our army" and reminded the Senate that "these soldiers were not school boys on a frolic."

President Roosevelt was understandably irritated by the fact that, during the investigation, the members of the 25th Infantry stood solidly by one another, refusing to give out information which they no doubt possessed, thereby shielding their guilty comrades. He knew that several of the noncommissioned officers must, of necessity, have known of the plan to steal rifles and to use them. This lack of discipline especially irked him. Stern as he was, however, Theodore Roosevelt was basically fair. He stated at the close of his second message that if any of the discharged men would come to him to clear himself of the charges against him he would then take what action appeared to be warranted.

One more point, at least, merits attention. There were numerous precedents in the Army for his action against the members

of the 25th Infantry. During the Civil War, the Sixtieth Ohio Regiment was discharged as mutinous and worthless. The Eleventh New York was discharged for similar reasons. Three companies of the Fifth Missouri Cavalry had been discharged for mutinous conduct. Perhaps the worst case cited by the President was the conduct of the Twentieth Illinois Regiment. Members of this regiment broke into a store and stole goods valued at $1,240. General Grant in a special field order assessed an equal sum against the regiment, after having discharged two commissioned officers for failing to do their duty.

Not only did General Grant take stiff disciplinary action of this sort when it became necessary, but General Robert E. Lee, facing the same sort of situation, was equally stern. In the spring of 1860 certain members of a regular army regiment under the command of Lee, then a Colonel, lynched a bartender who had killed a soldier. Colonel Lee, unable to discover the guilty persons, ordered the company to be disbanded and its members discharged without honor. Later, in October, 1864, when Lee was in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, he issued an order discharging an entire battalion for cowardly conduct.

Clearly Roosevelt took the proper disciplinary action in regard to the rioting troops at Brownsville. Discipline was immediate and just. That the soldiers involved were negroes had nothing to do with the punishment. "Every far sighted friend of the colored race in its efforts to strive onward and upward, should teach first as the most important lesson alike to the white man and the black, the duty of treating the individual man strictly on his worth as he shows it. Any conduct by colored people which tends to substitute for this rule the rule of standing by and shielding an evil doer because he is a member of their race, means the inevitable degradation of the colored race. It may and probably does mean damage to the white race, but it means ruin to the black race. In one policy, as in the other, I do not claim as a favor, but I challenge as a right, the support of every citizen of this country, whatever his color, provided only he has in him the spirit of genuine and far sighted patriotism." [3]

DONALD W. RESSLER
Springfield, Massachusetts

[3] Ibid, p. 7717.

Book Reviews

The Press and Society: A Book of Readings. **George L. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin(eds.). Pp. xv, 655. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.**

The sagaciously selected readings in this book carry too broad a title. "Press" means "newspapers." The "society" referred to is the United States, and hence there are only infrequent and inadequate references to the newspapers of other countries. Such a restriction, though perhaps editorially necessary, is regrettable in a book that seeks to provide perspective on the press and its problems. Splendid insights can always be obtained when systematic comparisons are made across national boundaries.

After disposing of this major criticism, it is a pleasure to heap only praise upon the volume. One-hundred-and-seventy diverse selections which range from Eric W. Allen (then Dean of the School of Journalism at the University of Oregon) to Casper S. Yost (then editor of the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*) have been skillfully fitted into twenty-seven chapters which in turn are grouped under three headings: "public opinion, propaganda, and press freedom", "the press at work in society," and "the press, a product of many forces." Each chapter contains an introduction which states its central problems and which interrelates the succeeding citations. The two editors, who are directors of schools of journalism, have indeed fulfilled the promise of their preface—"to present the pros and cons of controversial issues, such as the mooted influence of advertisers and the effect of concentration of ownership upon editorial independence." Their bias, as might be anticipated, is in favor of the American press and of the improvements which that press can continue to make. They present its weaknesses through the writings of its milder opponents, but they seem always able to trumpet its "source(s) of strength" by citing its more enthusiastic supporters.

It is imperative and fair to point out that, in this reviewer's opinion, only thirteen, or less than eight per cent, of the selections present results from concrete empirical investigations. The datum must be mentioned because the press is both the creator and the reflector of controversies—and one important way of retaining sanity in such a situation is to have verified facts within reach. Existing studies of the press, though not as voluminous or as convincing as might be desired, deserve a higher representation. This datum, however, is also misleading because

a very large number of the selections either contain facts of another kind (such as historical trends and statistical summaries) or are themselves facts in the sense that the expressed viewpoint of a publisher or a reporter is one of the forces affecting the press. Many of the "issues" that are discussed fall into the category of political or moral philosophy, and therefore can profoundly coast along on a debater's level.

The instructor or student who reads this impressive volume must emerge with a feeling for the problems, the techniques, and the responsibilities of American newspapers. The discussions which Bird and Merwin stimulate will inevitably continue in and outside the classroom. Somehow, though, some synthesizing frame of reference is needed in which to interpret and evaluate the ensuing perplexities. Perhaps the viewpoint and the methodology of social science can provide part of the orientation. In any event, each teacher who employs this book as a text will be compelled to provide some kind of a guide to his students. Otherwise they are likely not to be confused but to become apathetic as they perceive the richness and heterogeneity of these materials.

LEONARD W. DOOB
Yale University

U. S. A. The Permanent Revolution by the Editors of *Fortune* and Russell W. Davenport, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951. $1.50.

The editors of *Fortune* magazine are concerned because, in a time of crisis, Americans appear confused as to what objectives should guide their actions. The confusion, they believe, stems from the fact that "Americans of this generation have in a profound sense lost touch with their own meaning" and have failed to relate immediate objectives to the ultimate goals to which their society is dedicated. The times call for a definition of American goals, a restatement of the traditional objectives of our foreign and domestic policies against which to measure present plans and accomplishments. This book, originally published as the February, 1951, edition of *Fortune*, is presented as an answer to the question, what principles have guided our social and economic development in the past and to what extent are those principles still operative today?

This is a large order; but the authors come up with some arresting answers. The basic factor in American history, they hold—that which has given our society its characteristic flavor —has been our belief in "the sacredness of the free individual

and the Rights to be derived therefrom." This "American Proposition," together with the "American System" whose principles are liberty, equality, and constitutionalism, has been the fountainhead of America's past successes and must continue to guide our policies if we are to be true to our best selves in the future. Far from being, as critics have claimed, mere vestiges of an outmoded eighteenth century idealism, these principles provide a platform from which an effective attack can be launched against the problems which beset the contemporary world. Their continuing relevance lies in the potentialities of the human individual whose freedom they proclaimed and established. The American revolution is a permanent revolution because ". . . the human spirit . . . is limitless." No resting-place along the freedom road can be final; men will continue to move beyond the confines of any artificial status quo. The American system in its fundamental aspects is, consequently, in accord with the basic facts of individual human nature.

To sustain their thesis that the principles of the Declaration of Independence are still relevant, the authors survey selected segments of the social scene, pointing out areas in which the old ideas are still working with revolutionary effect. They find that capitalism in America has been subjected to popular control, that the individualistic competitive ideal still prevails and that industrial management has developed a sense of responsibility to the public and its employees which makes the free enterprise system something quite different from that which its critics conceive it to be. They argue that the American labor movement, unlike those of other countries, has been the worker's tool "for gaining and keeping as an individual the status and security of a full citizen in capitalist society," that it is infested with much the same individualistic spirit which marks the ideas of management. In the activities of private citizens' organizations, from the League of Women Voters to Alcoholics Anonymous, they see self-government at work on a non-political level, while the American political system provides a flexible, non-ideological instrument which integrates the nation's diversities while leaving free play for individual differences.

Projecting their analysis into the future, the authors assert that freedom for individual change and experimentation can provide durable solutions for the social problems ahead. All the resources of modern science and technology promise an even brighter future for those who accept the responsibility for their own betterment. Only private initiative in social and eco-

nomic affairs can meet the challenge and avoid the dangers of the monster state. Americans must sell this idea to the world by showing the world how it has worked and is working for us. Finally, our foreign policy must be geared to the ideals which have animated our domestic development. Since these individualistic principles are universal in their application and appeal, our diplomacy will be strengthened by putting them to work.

Such, in watered-down form, is the argument. The question arises, does the shoe fit? Can the clues to the fundamental problems of modern life still be found in a re-affirmation of the old dogmas? In many respects this is a convincing argument that the answer must be yes. A defensible case is made for the view that the old libertarian ideals still animate much American behavior and that they can be made to exercise a strong appeal in other quarters. The analysis of American society and of future policies shows real insight and pungency. Nevertheless, the argument cannot quite stand unaided; the treatment is superficial at several points. The "American way of life" cannot be summed up quite so neatly as the authors appear to believe. Granted that business leadership has come a long way, it is scarcely ready to accept the foreign and domestic policies which the editors of *Fortune* propose. The decline of individualism in the industrial world is glossed over. And the analysis of foreign policy is marred in some of its most suggestive aspects by the old Yalta-Formosa argument.

Still, the effort as a whole must be rated successful. If the authors have not provided a complete blueprint for the problems of today, they have at least outlined a forward-looking, conservative approach to them. The book should be widely read and used, as it was intended, as a starting point for further investigation.

MORRELL HEALD
Yale University

The Public School Scandal, by Earl Conrad, The John Day Company, New York, 1951. x, 270 pp.

One of the most important reasons for the failure of schoolteaching to achieve the professional status it so earnestly seeks is the conviction of most parents that they themselves could do at least as good a job in the classroom as does the instructional corps of the local public school. Mr. Conrad, a parent as well as "an experienced, independent newspaperman," is one of these, and vocally so. He seeks to point out the shortcomings

of the present public school system to other parents, less aware than he of the critical situation existing in that area.

Unfortunately, his effort, described on the dust-jacket as "a documented exposé," is a combination of parental exasperation and whip-the-wounded-horse journalism, seemingly rushed to the presses in an effort to gain a place on the anti-public school bandwagon now so far up the road. This kind of added weight may successfully stall what might otherwise have been an earnest movement toward reform.

Mr. Conrad fails to realize that many who go to the trouble of reading his polemic are going to be offended by the irresponsible and angry generalizations he makes. The parents who read books on the public school system have had enough acquaintance with schools, and probably as much as Mr. Conrad himself, to see the error of such sweeping and totally undocumented allegations as cram the pages of Conrad's tirade. It is difficult for some to be convinced by a man who gets his "low-down on what is going on in a majority of vocational schools . . . all over the country" from an anonymous file clerk ("What I am telling you, it is strictly from qui-*ee*-tus, Mr. Conrad, you are not mentioning my name and my job, I have to live, too, . . .") "over a couple of roast-beef sandwiches with plenty of mustard and a bottle of beer apiece." Of course, Mr. Conrad employs the "according to Washington sources" and I've-got-a-friend-on-the-inside-who-tells-me sort of documentation where he really feels that his readers might not take his word for some alleged corruption, malfeasance, or rottenness. The volume is liberally pocked with clippings gleaned from newspapers and other published articles on shortcomings in American schools, some of which are informative, most of which are familiar, and all of which are unmentioned in the text. (The captions are, I would guess, done by Mr. Conrad's six-year-old son, who had some difficulty with his schooling as rather extensively described in the early chapters.)

It is somewhat difficult to find just what Conrad is trying to point up, apart from his general dissatisfaction with schools, particularly those in urban New York, where his experience seems to have been almost exclusively centered. "The powers-that-be," (sometimes referred to as "the big shots" and the boys in the back room") Conrad maintains, assume

> "that it's okay to set up large five-story barracks for children in egg-crate style, put a teacher-forewoman in charge of each room, throw a dubious curriculum at both, and say, 'Go ahead, teach, teach madly. Make them meet

the standards, the tests, the grades. Make them jump hurdles. Turn schooling into a rate race. Let the first come first and the last come last. Teach 'em to like it or crack 'em up . . . Let them start racing at the age of six and the devil and the dumping grounds take the hindmost!"

Primarily the author is exercising over the mental deterioration of the nation's school children caused by "school shock," a traumatic condition resulting, in its turn, from "cheap, low-cost, inexpensive, run-down, economy-size public schooling." As the preceding redundancy would suggest, the basic cause of all the difficulty is money, and the certain remedy, federal aid. The doubling of teachers' salaries "in many states," and doubling the number of teachers throughout the nation, though these may "seem impractical," are necessary to provide for the country's minimum needs.

Much is wrong, and vitally wrong, with this nation's schools, and the arguments for federal aid are many and convincing. The responsible citizen will learn as much as he can of the ills and their possible cures, and will go about the task of making necessary improvements with earnestness and courage. I do not believe he need feel obliged to read this sensationalized treatment of the problem. It offers no new suggestion for the solution of educational problems, and it does not explore the economic or cultural ramifications of the familiar panacea which it does propose. (Bills for Federal Aid have been before each session of Congress since the close of the Civil War.) At bottom, about all the author has done is translate a broad and serious public concern into the language of yellow journalism, and invent for it some three-inch, red-banner headlines. He tries, unsuccessfully, to make sub-standard teaching read like rape, and administrative inefficiency like an atom bomb attack.

One consolation; Conrad has provided some fine materials for the *New Yorker's* "Statements-We-Doubt-Ever-Got-Made-By-Schoolchildren" Department:

"SMALL CHILD: Look, big shot, lay off my teacher. She hates her work. Maybe she hates me. With forty mugs like me in her class, taking care of us five or six hours a day, and handling all that paper work the principal gives her so that he can make a good showing to the board of education—what do you expect of her?"

"I am Claude, age ten. Teacher and principal said that I was worthless, a handicap to the school, dull, slow, lazy, upsetting to the others. But when they examined me at the Dallas Clinic they found malnutrition, syphilis, Hutchinson's disease, and poor eyesight. Why didn't the school examine

me when I was five or six instead of now, at ten, when so much of my will to learn has been destroyed?"

HOMER D. BABBIDGE, JR.
Yale University

How to Help Your Child in School, by Mary and Lawrence K. Frank. Viking Press, 1950.

Since its appearance a year ago the Frank's book on the relationships of family and school life has received praise from many reviewers and has been found valuable to a variety of readers. For parents, as the title suggests, it is a useful handbook and guide to be read and re-read as the family growns and grows up. In a simple style quite free from technical jargon, Mary and Lawrence Frank offer good advice and state the general principles of normal child development in our culture. Here is no refresher course in spelling and arithmetic, as some baffled parents might hope, but an interpretation of childhood in school and out.

For competent elementary school teachers much of what the Franks say may be a familiar story, but for secondary school teachers it might be most helpful. The authors say in a few chapters what many high school teachers either never knew or have forgotten. Possibly nothing would improve our high schools more than a thorough course in early childhood education for every teacher. This book would be an excellent text. One is reminded that the art of learning is difficult, to be achieved only by those who know what they are doing and who want to do it. High school seems unimportant compared to the elementary school, and this book makes it quite clear that there is no one as miraculously gifted as the really fine primary school teacher. With rumor and common sense the Franks have made an important contribution to the literature of education. Experienced teachers will find in it an up-to-date account of findings in child psychology. Young teachers can learn from it much about the problems of family life which affect school-room life.

ISABEL MCL. STEPHENS
Wellesley College

The School and Its Community, by John B. Whitelaw. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951.

The big problem in public school administration, Mr. Whitelaw states, is public relations. In the fewest possible words, (68 pages including a suggested reading list, and a brief sketch of

sources) the author assists the reader to "think through to the core of the problem itself."

Designed as a guide for school administrators, supervisors, and teachers who wish to create sound working relations between the school and its community, this book will also be of interest to school board members and to citizens groups who are working to improve public education. Although written primarily for those who staff our vast public education enterprises, it is addressed also to the individual who recognizes the present urgent needs of American democracy, and the role that public education should play in perpetual social reconstruction. There is much here also that the administrators and trustees of America's great non-tax supported (independent) schools can read and apply with benefit. Mr. Whitelaw has organized his book and subject in a most readable and practical manner.

OGDEN MILLER
Headmaster, The Gunnery

Brief Notices

E. P. Dutton and Company has imported thirteen volumes in the fine English edition of the *Children's Illustrated Classics*. All are books which children have read since the day they were written and will continue to read as long as they are published.

Uniform in format and size, bound in decorated cloth, the books are printed in clear, readable type. They are endowed with numerous illustrations, both in color and black and white, traditional in nature, and in keeping with the text of the stories. There is an appearance of thorough good taste about the entire series, which is too often lacking in today's reprints of the classics.

The following volumes are listed: (ea. $1.75)

Black Beauty by Anna Sewell. Illus. by Lucy Kemp Welch.
The Coral Island by R. M. Ballantyne. Illus. by Leo Bates.
Grimms' Fairy Tales. Illus. by Charles Folkard.
Heidi by Johanna Spyri. Illus. by Vincent O. Cohen.
Little Women by Louisa M. Alcott. Illus. by S. Van Abbe.
The Princess and Curdie by George MacDonald. Illus. by Charles Folkard.
The Princess and the Goblin by George MacDonald. Illus. by Charles Folkard.
Robin Hood by Carola Oman. Ilus. by S. Van Abbe.
The Swiss Family Robinson by J. R. Wyss. Illus. by Charles Folkard.

Tanglewood Tales by Nathaniel Hawthorne. Illus. by S. Van Abbe.

Tom Brown's Schooldays by Thomas Hughes. Illus. by S. Van Abbe (who was given special facilities at Rugby for making his pictures for this edition.)

Treasure Island by Robert Louis Stevenson. Illus. by S. Van Abbe.

A Wonder Book by Nathaniel Hawthorne. Illus. by S. Van Abbe.

Democratic Citizenship in Today's World by A. Elwood Adams and Edward Everett Walker. Pp. x, 373. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1951. $2.00 A textbook for a secondary school course in Civics, containing many helpful illustrations and tables. The text itself is clear and interesting.

The Growth of Western Civilization by A. E. R. Boak, Albert Hyma, and Preston Slosson. Pp. xxiii, 880. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., N. Y., 1951. $6.00 The fourth edition of a work first published in 1938. The authors discuss with admirable balance and lucidity the cultural development of Western Civilization from the Stone Age to the dismissal of General MacArthur. It has many excellent illustrations, bibliographies, and chronological tables.

Problems in American Democracy, 2nd revision, by S. Howard Patterson, A. W. Selwyn Little, and Henry Reed Burch. Pp. viii, 639. The Macmillan Company, Boston, Mass, 1951. An introduction to various problems, social, economic, and political, facing the United States today.

Social Learning Readers, by Marie Elizabeth Smith; illustrated by Gladys Peck and Eleanor Eadie. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1951, ($1.12 per vol.)

Bill's Story of the Wholesale Produce Market
Joe's Story of the Airport
Mother's Story of Dairying
Bob's Story of the Retail Food Market

For the lower elementary grades. Each book emphasizes a specific phase of community life and gives a detailed picture of a sequence of events that take place as people work together in a community. These books, attractive in appearance, and so written that 75% of the vocabulary is familiar, should appeal to most young children.